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When should you press the reload button? 
While surfing on the Internet, you may have observed the following. If a webpage takes a 
long time to download and you press the reload button then often the page promptly 
appears on your screen. Hence, the download was not hindered by congestion — then 
you’d better try again later — but by some other cause. 
If you do not know if some cause (like congestion) may hinder your download then what 
is a good strategy? When should you cancel the download and when should you press the 
reload button? Should you press it immediately or should you wait for a while? And how 
long should you wait before cancelling the download? We analyze these issues in this 
article, which is a non-technical impression of the paper “Efficiency of Repeated 
Network Interactions” [4] by Judith Timmer (UT) and Michel Mandjes (UvA). 
Problem description 
The amount of traffic transmitted over the Internet is still increasing. The main part of 
this traffic consists of transfers like video, data, and email. The completion times of these 
transfers vary over time due to several causes. First, there is Internet congestion — as the 
level of congestion fluctuates, the completion times do so as well. Next, you may have 
observed that if a webpage takes a long time to download and you press the reload button 
then the page may promptly appear on your screen. In this case we say the download 
request was hindered by non-congestion-related errors; this is a second cause of varying 
completion times. Users of the Internet do not know which of these two causes, if any, 
occurs.  
A user cancels a download request if he feels he has been waiting too long; he gets 
impatient. This personal maximum waiting time is called his impatience threshold. After 
canceling a download request he may wait some time before putting down a new request. 
This may improve his chances on a successful request — the request is completed before 
he gets impatient. If the user decides not to wait — his waiting time has length zero — 
this user is said to use a restart strategy [1]. Such a strategy is often used on the web when 
a page seems to take too long to load: users impatiently press the reload button, and often 
the page is promptly downloaded.  
Upon completion of the request the user spends some time reading or studying the page 
that was downloaded from the network. After finishing this, he immediately puts down a 
new request for a download.  
The goal of each user is to maximize his expected number of successful requests over a 
given time span by choosing a suitable impatience threshold and waiting time. We want 
to know how patient the user should be, how long he should wait before pressing the 
reload button, and if he should use a restart strategy. 
Model with congestion 
We study this problem in the most simple setting possible, namely a network used by two 
users. In our first model, we assume that the only cause of unsuccessful requests is 
congestion. If both users simultaneously use the network then it is congested; a download 
takes twice as long compared to the situation where a single user is on the network. The 
two users want to download and read pages (like webpages or documents) from the 
network. Each user knows the size of the page to be downloaded and knows how long it 
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takes to download this if there is no congestion. The time to read the page is a realization 
of the user’s exponential reading time. A user decides when to cancel a download request 
(that is, what his impatience threshold is) and how long to wait before reissuing his 
request (that is, what his waiting time is). Users cannot see whether the network is 
congested or not, and in addition they do not know the characteristics (like page size and 
strategy) of the other user. Further, a user only observes whether or not his page is 
already loaded; he does not observe the download progress. We assume a user is patient 
enough to have his page downloaded if there is no congestion during the download; this 
is a lower bound on his impatience threshold. Clearly, in congestion periods it takes 
relatively long to complete a download.  
If the network is congested while the user tries to download his page, he may get 
impatient before the download request is completed and cancels the download request. 
Since congestion is the only cause of unsuccessful requests in this model, the user 
concludes that the network was congested. Hence, he will wait for some amount of time 
before he issues a new download request.  
Extended model with non-congestion-related errors 
Our second model is an extension of the previous one and includes non-congestion-
related errors as a second cause of unsuccessful download requests. Assume that at the 
beginning of each download attempt such an error takes place with probability p. If it 
occurs, the download request is completely ignored — to the network it seems as if there 
was no request. After a certain time the user becomes impatient because his download 
request is not fulfilled. He cancels the request and waits for some time before putting 
down a new one. Notice that, in contrast to the previous model, here the user cannot 
deduce the cause (congestion or non-congestion-related errors) of the unsuccessful 
download. Also remark that for probability p = 0 non-congestion-related errors cannot 
occur, and this model boils down to the first model. 
Solution methods 
Each user wishes to maximize the expected number of pages he can download and read 
in a fixed time interval. Notice that this number does not only depend on his own strategy 
but also on the strategy of the other user. This dependence on each other's strategies 
implies that the two users are actually involved in a two-player non-cooperative game. In 
such a game, the users are the players, a strategy of a player is a pair of impatience 
threshold and waiting time, and the payoff of a player is the expected number of pages he 
can download and read in a fixed time interval given the strategies of both players. The 
strategy pairs of the users are called Nash equilibrium strategies [3] if no user can 
download and read more pages by unilateral deviation from his own strategy. 
The analysis of this game with its repeated network interactions is difficult and complex 
due to the stochastic reading times of the users. Conventional methods in non-cooperative 
game theory cannot handle stochastic components, and so, it is hard to determine the 
equilibrium strategies of this game. Therefore, simulation is used to search for 
equilibrium strategies in this two-person network for both models.  
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Computational results 
In the first model congestion is the single source of unsuccessful download requests. We 
say that a user is as patient as possible if he is patient enough for his page to be 
completely downloaded under congestion. Also, he is as impatient as possible if a request 
is only successful if there is no congestion. The simulation results are as follows. 
• If the page sizes are almost equal then in any equilibrium strategy all users are as 
patient as possible, and any waiting time may be chosen.  
• Otherwise, if there are differences in job sizes then the equilibrium strategies are 
as follows. Assume that user 1 has the smallest page size. Then this user is as 
patient as possible. User 2 need not be that patient, but he should also not be as 
impatient as possible. Again, any waiting time is fine. 
This result has the following explanation. If a user is as patient as possible then any 
download request is successful. The user never has to abort a download and consequently 
never has to wait before starting a new attempt. Hence, since all download attempts are 
successful the user optimizes the number of pages he can read. Setting a waiting time is 
superfluous, and hence any waiting time may be chosen. 
Notice that some equilibrium strategies are restart strategies and others are not. 
 
In the second model unsuccessful requests are caused by congestion or by non-
congestion-related errors. The simulation results for probability p = 0.10 are as follows. 
• If the page sizes are similar then both users have a unique equilibrium strategy, 
namely to be as patient as possible, and set zero waiting times. 
• If there are small differences in page size, assume that the page of user 1 is the 
smallest. Then in any equilibrium strategy user 1 is as patient as possible, user 2 
need not be that patient but he should also not be as impatient as possible, and 
both users have zero waiting times. 
• If there are large differences in page size, assume that the page of user 1 is the 
smallest. Then in any equilibrium strategy user 1 as patient as possible, user 2 
may have any impatient threshold except being as patient or impatient as possible, 
and both users have zero waiting times. 
Remark that in all equilibrium strategies the user with the smallest page size is as patient 
as possible. Further note that none of the users waits for a positive amount of time after 
cancelling an unsuccessful download request. Both users immediately put down a new 
download request, which has a negative effect on network congestion. These restart 
strategies seem logical since if a user is as patient as possible and experiences an 
unsuccessful download request then he concludes it was caused by a non-congestion 
related error. Therefore, it makes no sense to wait and the user chooses to place a new 
download request immediately. Hence, under the presence of non-congestion-related 
errors all equilibrium strategies are restart strategies. 
Concluding remarks 
We studied a network with two users. Each of them wants to maximize its expected 
number of successful download requests over a given time span by choosing a suitable 
impatience threshold and waiting time. In the first model, where congestion is the only 
cause of unsuccessful requests, each of the users will be very patient and any waiting 
time is possible. Hence, restart strategies are just one type of equilibrium strategies. In the 
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second model, where non-congestion related errors may occur, users also set large 
impatience thresholds but now they have zero waiting times — they immediately reissue 
an unsuccessful download. In this case all equilibrium strategies are restart strategies. 
Hence, we conclude that in both models users may use restart strategies because these are 
equilibrium strategies.  
Our results depend on the fact that there are only two users in the network. An interesting 
extension of this study is to investigate if restart strategies remain among the equilibrium 
strategies when the number of network users increases. It seems very likely that this will 
not be true and that waiting times will be positive because the uncertainty about the cause 
of the unsuccessful requests increases. Future research should clarify this. 
References 
[1] S.M. Maurer, B.A. Huberman: Restart strategies and Internet congestion,  
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 25 (2001), 641-654. 
[2] J. Mo, J. Walrand: Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control, 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 8 (2000), 556-567. 
[3] J. Nash: Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54 (1951), 286-295. 
[4] J. Timmer, M. Mandjes: Efficiency of repeated network interactions. 
International Journal of Electronics and Communications, 63 (2009), 271-
278. 
 4
